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Abstract
Evidence suggests that banks, like ﬁrms, face ﬁnancial frictions when raising funds. The authors
develop a quantitative, monetary business cycle model in which agency problems affect both the
relationship between banks and ﬁrms and the relationship between banks and their depositors. As
a result, bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth jointly determine aggregate investment, and
are important determinants of the propagation of shocks.
The authors ﬁnd that the effects of monetary policy and technology shocks are dampened but
more persistent in their model than in an economy where the information friction that banks face
is reduced or eliminated. After documenting that the bank capital-asset ratio is countercyclical in
the data, the authors show that their model, in which movements in this ratio are market-
determined, can replicate the countercyclical ratio.
JEL classiﬁcation: E44, E52, G21
Bank classiﬁcation: Business ﬂuctuations and cycles; Financial institutions; Transmission of
monetary policy
Résumé
D’après les indications disponibles, les banques, comme les entreprises, seraient confrontées à des
frictions ﬁnancières lorsqu’elles mobilisent des fonds. Les auteurs ont donc mis au point un
modèle monétaire quantitatif du cycle économique dans lequel il existe une asymétrie
d’information aussi bien entre les banques et les entreprises qu’entre les banques et les déposants.
Il s’ensuit que les capitaux propres des banques et la valeur nette des entreprises déterminent
conjointement le niveau global de l’investissement et jouent un rôle important dans la propagation
des chocs.
Les auteurs relèvent que les effets de la politique monétaire et des chocs technologiques sont
moins importants mais plus persistants dans leur modèle que dans une économie où les frictions
informationnelles touchant les banques sont limitées, voire exclues. Après avoir établi, données à
l’appui, que le ratio de couverture des actifs des banques par les capitaux propres évolue en sens
inverse du cycle, les auteurs montrent que leur modèle, où ce ratio est déterminé par le marché,
parvient à en reproduire le comportement anticyclique.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E44, E52, G21
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cycles et ﬂuctuations économiques; Institutions ﬁnancières; Trans-
mission de la politique monétaire1 Introduction
A large literature has recently emerged that analyzes the quantitative importance of agency costs
in otherwise-standard business cycle models. Contributions to this literature usually specify
a single information friction, which aects the relationship between nancial intermediaries
(banks) and their borrowers (rms) and limits the amount of external nancing that rms
can obtain. In such a context, the net worth of rms becomes an important element in the
propagation of shocks, because of its ability to mitigate the information friction.1
Evidence, however, suggests that banks themselves are subject to nancial frictions in rais-
ing loanable funds. Schneider (2001) reports that regional and rural U.S. banks appear to be
nancially constrained relative to banks that operate in urban centres. Further, a large body of
evidence suggests that poorly capitalized banks have limited lending ﬂexibility, a fact consistent
with the presence of nancial frictions at the bank level.2 Moreover, Hubbard, Kuttner, and
Palia (2002) show that dierences in the capital positions of individual banks aect the rate at
which their clients can borrow. These facts imply that bank capital (bank net worth) might
contribute to the propagation of shocks and that therefore its evolution should be analyzed
jointly with that of rm net worth.
This paper undertakes such an analysis. We develop a quantitative model that studies the
link between the evolution of bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth on the one hand, and
monetary policy and economic activity on the other. The framework we employ is a monetary,
dynamic general-equilibrium version of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) that features two sources
of moral hazard: the rst aects the relationship between banks and their borrowers (rms or
entrepreneurs), and the second inﬂuences the link between banks and their own source of funds
(depositors). The rst source of moral hazard arises because entrepreneurs, who produce the
economy's capital good, can privately choose to undertake riskier projects in order to enjoy
private benets. To mitigate this problem, banks require entrepreneurs to invest their own net
1This literature originates in the theoretical work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Williamson (1987), and
is exemplied by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998, 2001) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Other
contributions include Cooley and Nam (1998) and Fuerst (1995). The mechanism described in these papers has
often been described as the \nancial accelerator."
2See, for example, the discussions about the \capital crunch" of the early 1990s (Bernanke and Lown 1991;
Peek and Rosengren 1995; Brinkmann and Horvitz 1995), and the evidence (Peek and Rosengren 1997, 2000) that
shocks to the capital position of Japanese banks resulting from the late 1980s crash in the Nikkei had negative
eects on their lending activities in the United States.
1worth in the projects. The second source of moral hazard stems from the fact that banks, to
which depositors delegate the monitoring of entrepreneurs, may not adequately do so to lower
their costs. In response, depositors demand that banks invest their own net worth|that is,
bank capital|in the nancing of entrepreneurial projects.
We embed this framework within a standard monetary model that we calibrate to salient fea-
tures of the U.S. economy. Our ndings are as follows. First, we show that the presence of bank
capital aects the economy's response to shocks. Specically, the eects of monetary policy and
technology shocks are dampened and slightly more persistent in our model than in an economy
where the information friction that banks face is eliminated and, as a consequence, bank capital
is not present. This is consistent with evidence that monetary policy contractions will depress
lending and economic activity more signicantly when bank capital is low.3 In addition, a sen-
sitivity analysis reveals that varying the severity of this nancial friction modies the impact of
economic shocks. Second, after documenting that the bank capital-asset ratio is countercyclical
in the data, we show that our model, in which movements in this ratio are market-determined
rather than originating from regulatory requirements, can replicate the countercyclical ratio.
Intuitively, the mechanism featured in this paper functions as follows. A contractionary
monetary policy shock raises the opportunity cost of the external funds that banks use to nance
investment projects. In response, the market requires that banks and rms nance a bigger
per-unit share of investment projects with their own net worth; i.e., bank capital-asset ratios
must increase and entrepreneurial leverage must fall. Since bank capital and entrepreneurial
net worth are largely predetermined (they consist of retained earnings from preceding periods),
bank lending must be reduced and thus aggregate investment must fall. In turn, lower aggregate
investment depresses the earnings of banks and entrepreneurs, thereby reducing future bank
capital and entrepreneurial net worth, the declines of which continue to propagate the shock
over time after the initial impulse to the interest rate has dissipated. Note that, in contrast
to the existing \accelerator" literature, the joint evolution of entrepreneurial net worth and
bank capital aects how much external nancing rms can raise, and therefore the scale of the
3Van den Heuvel (2002b) reports that the capital position of a state's banking system is negatively related
to the subsequent reaction to that state's output following monetary policy shocks. Kishan and Opiela (2000)
report that poorly capitalized banks experience more signicant declines in their lending following monetary
contractions. In a related result, Kashyap and Stein (2000) show that banks that hold more liquid securities are
able to limit the reductions in lending following similar contractions.
2investment projects undertaken. In the experiments where the nancial friction that banks face is
reduced, banks hold less capital (none if the friction is completely eliminated), and bank lending
therefore relies relatively more on household deposits. In such circumstances, the increase in
the price of these deposits that a contractionary shock causes leads to bigger adverse eects on
investment and output.
Our paper is related to others that study the link between bank capital and economic activ-
ity. Van den Heuvel (2002a) analyzes the relationship between bank capital, regulatory require-
ments, and monetary policy. In his model, bank capital is held as a buer stock against the
eventuality that regulatory requirements will bind in the future, as opposed to our model, where
bank capital serves to mitigate the nancial friction faced by banks. Moreover, the production,
savings, and monetary sides of Van den Heuvel's (2002a) model are not fully developed, whereas
we present a detailed general-equilibrium model. Unlike in Chen's (2001) paper, which also con-
structs a dynamic version of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), our paper studies quantitatively the
link between bank capital and monetary policy, by embedding the double moral hazard envi-
ronment in a standard monetary version of the neoclassical model.4 Other recent papers that
consider bank capital in dynamic frameworks include Smith and Wang (2000) and Berka and
Zimmermann (2002). The role assigned to bank capital in those papers, however, diers from
the role it plays in our paper.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic structure
of the model. To reduce the complexity and focus the discussion on the nancial contract that
links banks, entrepreneurs, and households, we assume that households are risk-neutral and that
only entrepreneurs require external nancing. The model is calibrated in section 3. Section 4
reports the implications of the basic model for the eects of wealth shocks, monetary policy,
and technology shocks on economic activity. Section 5 extends the model, by introducing risk
aversion in household preferences and requiring bank nancing in both sectors (capital-good and
consumption-good production) of the economy. It shows that the main qualitative features of
the results are not aected by these extensions. Section 6 describes our two main ndings: (i)
4Another dierence is the presence of physical capital in our model.
5In Smith and Wang (2000), bank capital plays the role of a buer stock that allows banks to continue servicing
the liquidity requirements of long-lived nancial relationships with rms. In Berka and Zimmermann (2002) bank
capital is valued because of exogenously imposed capital adequacy requirements. See also Stein (1998), Bolton
and Freixas (2000), and Schneider (2001).
3the presence of bank capital aects the amplitude and the persistence of shocks, and (ii) the
market-generated capital-asset ratio is countercyclical. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The environment
There are three classes of risk-neutral agents in the economy: households, entrepreneurs, and
bankers, with a population mass of h, e,a n db, respectively, where h + e + b =1 . I n
addition, there is a monetary authority that conducts monetary policy by targeting interest
rates.
There are two distinct sectors of production. In the rst, many competitive rms produce
the economy's nal good, using a standard constant-returns-to-scale technology that employs
physical capital and labour services as inputs. Production in this sector is not aected by any
nancial frictions.
In the second sector, entrepreneurs produce a capital good that will augment the economy's
stock of physical capital. Contrary to the rst sector, the production environment in the capital-
good sector is characterized by two distinct sources of moral hazard, and the resulting agency
problems limit the extent to which entrepreneurs can receive external funding to nance their
production. First, the technology available to entrepreneurs is characterized by idiosyncratic
risk that is partially under the (private) control of the entrepreneur. Monitoring entrepreneurs
is thus necessary to limit the riskiness of the projects they engage in. Second, the monitoring
activities performed by the agents capable of undertaking them, the bankers, are themselves not
publicly observable. Moreover, a given bank cannot choose projects to nance in a manner that
diversies away the risk to its loan portfolio, thus implying that a bank can fail.
To limit the impact of these nancial imperfections, households (the ultimate lenders in this
economy) require that both entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital be invested in a project
before they can be induced to deposit their own money towards the funding of entrepreneurs'
projects. The joint evolution of entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital thus becomes an
important determinant in the reaction of the economy to the shocks that aect it.
Households are innitely lived; they save by holding physical capital and money. They divide
4their money holdings between what they send to banking institutions and what they keep as cash;
a cash-in-advance constraint for consumption rationalizes their demand for cash. Households
cannot monitor entrepreneurs or enforce nancial contracts, and therefore lend to them only
indirectly, through their association with a bank that acts as delegated monitor. Bankers and
entrepreneurs face a constant probability of exiting the economy; surviving individuals save
by holding capital, whereas those who receive the signal to exit the economy consume their
accumulated wealth. Exiting entrepreneurs and bankers are replaced by newly born individuals,
so that the population masses of the three classes of agents do not change. Figure 1 illustrates
the timing of events that unfold each period in our model. In section 2.2 we will describe in
greater detail these events, the optimizing behaviour of each type of agent, and the connections
between them.
2.2 Households
Each household enters period t with a stock, Mt, of money and a stock, kh
t , of physical capital.
The household is also endowed with one unit of time, which is divided between leisure, work, and
the time cost of adjusting the household's nancial portfolio. At the beginning of the period,
the current value of the aggregate technology and monetary shocks is revealed.
The household then separates into three dierent agents with specic tasks. The household
shopper takes an amount, Mc
t , of the household's money balances, travels to a retail market,
and purchases consumption goods (ch
t )f o rt h eh o u s e h o l d . T h enancier gets the remaining
amount of money balances, Mt−Mc
t , which, along with Xt (the household's share of the current
injection of new money from the central bank), will serve as the household's contribution to the
nancing of entrepreneurial projects. The return from this nancing is risky: entrepreneurial
projects nanced with the help of the household's funds could fail. In such a case, those funds
are lost completely; the probability that this will happen is denoted by ~  (the determination of
~  is discussed below). Finally, the household's worker travels to the nal-good sector and sells
the household's labour services (ht) at a real wage, wh
t , and the household's physical capital
(kh
t ), which carries a (real) rental rate of rk
t .
We assume that an unanticipated monetary injection is distributed to the households' -
nanciers rather than to the shoppers. The monetary injection therefore enters the economy
5through the nancial markets, creating an imbalance between the amount of liquidity present
in nancial markets and what is available in the nal-good market. In principle, households
could correct this imbalance by reducing the amount of liquidity they send to nancial markets
(i.e., increasing Mc
t ), but the costs inherent in adjusting nancial portfolios limits the extent to
which they are prepared to do so. As a consequence, some of the imbalance remains, leading to
a reduction in the opportunity cost of funds in the nancial market and thus downward pres-
sure on nominal interest rates. This limited-participation assumption is used in several recent
quantitative models of monetary policy, such as in Dotsey and Ireland (1995), Christiano and
Gust (1999), and Cooley and Quadrini (1999).




























the time cost of adjusting the household nancial portfolio.6 The
expectation is taken over uncertainty about aggregate shocks to monetary policy and technology
as well as over the idiosyncratic shocks that aect each household (the success or failure of
the projects that the household will indirectly nance through its association with a banker).
The risk-neutrality behaviour that characterizes this utility function implies that households
value only expected returns and do not seek to smooth out their consumption patterns.7 The





































Pt ) must be sucient to cover planned expenditures of consumption goods (ch
t ). The budget
constraint (3) expresses the evolution of the household's assets, with the sources of income on the
6We follow Christiano and Gust (1999) in using units of time to express the costs of adjusting nancial
portfolios.
7The assumption of risk-neutrality is important for the nancial contract between households, banks, and
entrepreneurs, as discussed in section 2.5.
6right-hand side of the equation, and the assets purchased on the left. The rst source of income
is the (real) return from the deposits (Mt−Mc
t +Xt) invested by the household in the bank. We
denote the expected return of these deposits by rd
t. Hence, since ~  is the probability of success
of the entrepreneurial projects nanced by the bank, the realized return is
rd
t
~  if the project is
successful (an outcome indicated by st = 1), and 0 otherwise (st = 0). Three additional sources





wage and capital rental income collected by the worker (wh
t ht +rk
t kh
t ), and the real value of the
undepreciated stock of capital qt(1−)kh
t ,w h e r eqt is the value of capital at the end of the period
in terms of nal goods. Total income is then transferred into nancial assets (end-of-period real
money balances, Mt+1=Pt), or holdings of physical capital (kh
t+1).
The rst-order conditions of the problem with respect to ch
t , Mt+1, Mc
t , ht,a n dkh
t+1 are as
follows:


















(ht+1 + vt+1)γ−1v2 (t+1)

; (6)





t+1 + qt+1(1 − ))
i
: (8)
In these expressions, 1t represents the Lagrange multiplier of the cash-in-advance constraint
(2) and 2t a similar multiplier of the budget constraint (3).
Equation (4), which equates the sum of the two Lagrange multipliers to 1, reﬂects the fact
that the marginal utility of consumption is constant for the risk-neutral household. Equation
(5) states that, by choosing an extra unit of currency as a savings vehicle, the household is
forgoing a utility value of 2t
Pt ; the household is compensated, in the next period, with the return
from holding this extra unit of currency (the gross nominal interest rate, rd
t+1), a return which,







Equation (6) states that, by choosing to keep an extra unit of currency for use in the nal-
good sector, the household forgoes the return that would have been associated with this extra
unit if it had been sent to the nancial sector (rd
t), and must pay adjustment costs valued at
7(ht + vt)γ−1v1 (t). In return, the household receives the current utility value of this extra
liquidity (1t + 2t), and relaxes the next period's expected portfolio adjustment costs by an
amount valued at Et

(ht+1 + vt+1)γ−1v1 (t+1)

. Equations (7) and (8) are standard; because
2 < 1, however, inﬂation introduces a distortion in labour-supply decisions.
2.3 Final-good production
The nal-good sector features perfectly competitive producers that transform physical capital
and labour inputs into the economy's nal good. The production function they use exhibits
constant returns to scale and is aected by serially correlated technology shocks. Aggregate
output, Yt,i sg i v e nb y :
Yt = ztF(Kt;Hh
t ); (9)
where zt is the technology shock, Kt the aggregate stock of physical capital, and Hh
t the aggregate
labour inputs from households. No nancial frictions are present in this sector; therefore, the
usual rst-order conditions for prot maximization apply and the aggregate prots of nal-good
producers are zero. The constant-returns-to-scale feature of the production function implies that
we can concentrate on economy-wide relations, which will coincide with the rm-level relations.
We assume that the technology shock evolves according to a standard AR(1) process, so
that:
zt = z zt−1 + z
t; z
t  (0;z): (10)
The competitive nature of this sector implies that the rental rate of capital and the wage are







8To ensure that bankers and entrepreneurs can always pledge a positive (but possibly very small) amount of
net worth in the nancial contract negotiations, we also assume that the aggregate production function includes
a small role for labour inputs from entrepreneurs and bankers, which entitles them to small wage payments every
period. Since those wages have no eects on the dynamics of the model, we ignore them, in keeping with Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997, 2001). Similarly, Chen (2001) assumes that entrepreneurs and bankers are entitled to modest
levels of endowment each period.
82.4 Capital-good production
Each entrepreneur has access to a production technology that uses units of the nal good as
input and generates capital goods if successful. Specically, an investment of size it units of nal
goods will contemporaneously yield a publicly observable return of Rit units of physical capital
if the project succeeds, but zero units if it fails; the investment size it is specied in the lending
contract and chosen jointly by the entrepreneur and their nancial backers.
Entrepreneurs can inﬂuence the riskiness of the projects they undertake; they may pursue
a project that has a low probability of success because of the private benets that stem from
it and which accrue solely to them. Specically, we follow the formulation of Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997) and Chen (2001) and assume that three types of project exist, each carrying a
dierent mix of public return and private benets.9 First, the good project involves a high
probability of success (denoted g) and zero private benets. Second, the low private benet
project, while associated with a lower probability of success b (b < g), generates private
benets proportional to the investment size and equal to bi t. Third, the high private benet
project, while also associated with the low probability of success b, brings to the entrepreneurs
higher private benets Bi t,w i t hB>b . Table 1 summarizes the probability of success and
private benets associated with the three types of projects. Given that the two latter projects
have the same probability of success but dierent levels of private benets, entrepreneurs would
prefer the last project (which has a higher private benet), regardless of the nancial contract.
Table 1: Projects Available to the Entrepreneur
Project Good Low private benet High private benet
Private benets 0 bit Bit
Probability of success g b b
Bankers have access to a monitoring technology that can limit the extent to which en-
trepreneurs are able to engage in risky projects. The technology can detect whether the en-
trepreneurs have undertaken the project with high private benet, but it cannot distinguish
between the other two projects.10 This implies that, if banks use monitoring technology, the en-
9The presence of three projects enables us to model a situation where bank monitoring is imperfect and cannot
completely eliminate the asymmetric information problem.
10Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Chen (2001), we interpret the monitoring activities of bankers to
9trepreneur will not undertake the project with high private benets, an outcome that is socially
preferable because of the following assumption about returns:
qbR + B − (1 + ) < 0 <q  gR − (1 + ); (13)
where  is the monitoring cost of banks. Equation (13) states that, even after accounting for the
private benet it provides, the economic return from the third project is negative. In contrast,
it is economically viable to pursue the good project.
Monitoring costs are assumed to be proportional to the size of the project; it units of the
nal good are spent on monitoring when a project of size it is nanced.11 The monitoring
activities of bankers are not, however, publicly observable. This creates an additional source of
moral hazard that aects the relationship between bankers and their depositors (the households).
The nature of the monitoring technology is assumed to imply that all projects funded by a
given bank either succeed together or fail together. This perfect correlation implies that each
bank faces an idiosyncratic risk of failure that cannot be diversied away.12 The solution of the
model is therefore straightforward, but it can be relaxed at a cost of added complexity; for the
above mechanism to remain, it is necessary that the correlation not be zero.13
An entrepreneur with a net worth of nt who undertakes a project of size it >n t needs to rely
on external nancing from banks worth ld
t = it −nt. The bank provides this funding with a mix
of deposits that it collects from the households (dt), as well as its own net worth (capital) at.
Once the costs of monitoring the project (= it) are taken into account, the bank is able to lend
an amount ls
t = at+dt−it. Banks engage their own funds to mitigate the moral hazard problem
that aects their relationship with depositors; in doing so, they have an incentive to monitor
entrepreneurs, in order to limit erosion of their capital position. This reassures depositors, who
mean that they inspect cash ﬂows, balance sheets, etc., or verify that rm managers conform with the covenants
of a loan. This interpretation diers from the one assigned to monitoring costs in the literature on costly state
verication (CSV), where the costs are associated with bankruptcy-related activities.
11The proportionality in the monitoring costs as well as in the private benets makes the aggregation of all
contracts straightforward.
12The assumption of perfect correlation in the returns of bank assets is the opposite of the extreme assumption
in Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1987), where bank assets are perfectly diversied so that banks do not fail
and can be encouraged to monitor without their own capital. Ennis (2001a) presents a model where banks may
choose to diversify at a cost, and where large, diversied banks and small, non-diversied ones coexist.
13The assumption that a given banker cannot diversify perfectly across all their lines of business can be inter-
preted as a situation where they have specialized their activities within a given sector of the economy, or a given
geographical area; in such a situation, the risk of failure will naturally be positively correlated across all projects.
10can then provide more of their own funds towards the nancing package.
2.5 Financial contract
We concentrate on equilibria where intermediation occurs and the nancial contracts lead en-
trepreneurs to undertake only the good project; g thus represents the probability of success of
all projects and the probability that households' deposits are repaid (~  = g). We also assume
the presence of interperiod anonymity, which implies that only one-period contracts are feasible
and allows us to abstract from the complexities that arise from dynamic contracting.14 The
contract species how much each of the three participants should invest in the project and how
much they should be paid as a function of the project's outcome. One optimal contract will
have the following structure: (i) the entrepreneur invests all their net worth, while the bank
and the households put up the balance, it − nt, (ii) if the project succeeds, the unit return,
R, is distributed between the entrepreneur (Re
t > 0), the banker (Rb
t > 0), and the households
(Rh
t > 0), and (iii) all agents receive nothing if the project fails.
Recall that an investment of size it returns Ri t units of capital good if it is successful,
and nothing if it fails. The expected value (in nal-good terms) of the entrepreneur's share
of the return is thus qtgRe
tit if the good project is chosen, where qt is the relative price of
capital goods in terms of nal goods. The nancial contract that links the entrepreneur, the
banker, and, implicitly, the household seeks to maximize the entrepreneur's expected return,
subject to constraints that ensure that entrepreneurs and bankers behave as agreed and that the
funds contributed by the banker and the household earn (market-determined) required rates of









14One-period contracts are also used by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999). General-equilibrium models that focus on dynamic contracting are described in Gertler (1992), Smith
















t it  rd
tdt; (19)
at + dt − it  it − nt: (20)
Equation (15) simply states that the shares promised to the three dierent agents must add
up to the total return. Equation (16) is the incentive compatibility constraint for bankers, which
must be satised for monitoring to occur. It states that the expected return from monitoring,
net of the monitoring costs, must be at least as high as the expected return from not monitoring,
a situation in which entrepreneurs would choose the project with high private benets and a low
probability of success. Equation (17) is the incentive compatibility constraint of entrepreneurs;
because bankers monitor, entrepreneurs cannot choose the high private benet project, but
must be induced to choose the good project over the low private benet one. This is achieved by
promising entrepreneurs an expected return that is at least as high as the expected return they
would get, inclusive of private benets, if they were to choose the low private benet project.
Equations (18) and (19), the participation constraints of bankers and households, respectively,
state that when these agents engage bank capital and deposits at and dt, they are promised shares
of the project's return that are sucient to attain the (market-determined) required rates of
return on bank capital and household deposits (denoted ra
t and rd
t, respectively). Equation
(20) indicates that the loanable funds available to a banker (its own capital and the deposits
it attracted), net of the monitoring costs, must be sucient to cover the external funding
requirements of the entrepreneur.15
In equilibrium, the constraints (16) to (19) hold with equality, so that the shares are given
15In what follows, we consider only contracts in which (20) holds with equality, because those contracts dominate




















where  = g − b > 0a n dR
j
t > 0f o rj = e;b;h.
Note from (21) and (22) that the size of the shares allocated to the entrepreneur and the
bank is determined by the severity of the moral hazard problem that characterizes their actions.
In particular, were the private benets, b, and the monitoring costs, , to increase, the per-unit
share of the project's return allocated to entrepreneurs and bankers would also have to increase
for those agents to continue to have an incentive to behave as agreed. In turn, (23) shows that
the per-unit share of projects that can be credibly promised to households as payments for their
deposits is limited by the extent of these moral hazard problems; were b and  to increase, this
maximal payment to households would decrease.
The introduction of (23) into the participation constraint of households (19) holding with












Next, eliminating dt from (24) using the resource constraint (20), and dividing both sides by





















Equation (25) illustrates the mechanism that will lead monetary policy shocks to have an eect
on the leverage of the economy. An increase in the required rate on deposits, rd
t,d o e sn o t
aect (all things equal) the maximal per-unit share of the project's return that can be credibly
promised to households (the right-hand side of (25)). This increase must be compensated for by
a reduction in the contribution of households' funds to the nancing; i.e., by an increase in the
contributions of bank capital (at=it) and entrepreneurial net worth (nt=it). At the aggregate
level, since bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth do not react immediately to the shock,
13the adjustment must occur through a reduction in the size of the projects that are nanced; i.e.,
by a decrease in investment.
Solving for it in the preceding equation leads to the following relation between the size of
the project undertaken, on the one hand, and entrepreneurial net worth and the bank's capital



















In equilibrium, the investment, it,m u s tb ep o s i t i v e ,s oGt must be positive (since at and nt are
positive). Therefore, rates of return and prices should be such that:
qtg (b + =qt)=>q tgR − rd
t(1 + ); (28)
where condition (28) says that the sum of expected shares paid to the entrepreneur and banker
is higher than the expected unit surplus of the good project.
With the size of the investment project determined, we can dene the bank capital-asset
ratio for this individual contract, as follows:
cat =
at
(1 + )it − nt
: (29)
The quantity it in (26) represents the amount of consumption good invested in the production
of the capital good. Thus, the expected output of new capital is is(nt;a t;rd
t;qt)=gRit.O n c e
aggregated (see section 2.8), this can be interpreted as the supply curve for the investment good.





< 0, this supply curve is upward sloping. Further, (26)
makes clear that increases in at or nt shift this supply curve to the right, whereas the intuition
discussed above with respect to equation (25) shows that increases in rd
t s h i f tt h ec u r v et ot h e
left.16
2.6 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs manage investment projects and seek to maximize the expected value of their
lifetime utility. They face a constant probability of exiting the economy; this probability is
16The demand for the capital good is implicitly dened by the rst-order condition of the household problem
(equation (8)).
14denoted as 1− e,s ot h a te is the probability of surviving until the next period. The assump-
tion of nite horizons for entrepreneurs is one way to guarantee that entrepreneurs will never
become suciently wealthy to overcome nancial constraints.17 We calibrate e such that, in
the steady state, entrepreneurs continue to rely on external nancing for their activities. Fur-
ther, entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and are thus willing to accept very low or zero consumption
for many periods in return for relatively high consumption in the future, conditional on their







t denotes entrepreneurial consumption.
Entrepreneurs that must exit the economy receive the signal to do so at the end of the period.
Thus, surviving and exiting entrepreneurs participate similarly in the period's activities (nan-
cial contract, capital-good production, etc.). They dier, however, in their saving decisions:
exiting entrepreneurs consume all available income, whereas surviving ones save for the future.
Exiting entrepreneurs are replaced, at the beginning of the following period, by newborn agents;
in this manner, the measure of entrepreneurs within the total population remains constant at
e.
At the beginning of period, t, a fraction, e, of the total number of entrepreneurs present are
therefore agents who have survived the preceding period, possibly carrying with them accumu-
lated assets: the stock of physical capital that such a surviving entrepreneur holds is denoted by
ke
t. The remaining fraction (1 − e) of entrepreneurs are newborn agents, who begin the period
with no assets.
During the early part of the period, each entrepreneur travels to the nal-good sector, where
they rent their holdings, if any, of physical capital (at rate rk
t ). This source of income, plus
the value of the undepreciated part of the physical capital, constitutes the net worth that
entrepreneurs can pledge towards nancing the investment projects in the second part of the
17Another way to guarantee that entrepreneurs do not become self-nanced is to assume that they are innitely
lived but discount the future more heavily than households do. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) use this approach.
15period. Entrepreneurial net worth is thus given by18:
nt = rk
t ke
t + qt(1 − )ke
t: (31)
In the second part of the period, after meeting with a banker and (implicitly) the household's
nancier, each entrepreneur engages in an investment project of size it, the maximum that
nancial backers will allow; recall from (26) that the size of the project is related to net worth,
nt,b yit = nt+at
Gt . As the spot market for capital opens, this entrepreneur can sell some of this




t+1  st qtRe
tit(nt;a t;Gt); (32)
where st is the indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the entrepreneur's project was a
success and returned the share Re
t to the entrepreneur, or 0 if the project failed and returned
nothing to the three participants. Successful, surviving entrepreneurs could, in principle, allocate
part of their income to consumption, and part to saving. However, the risk-neutrality feature
of their preferences, and the high (expected) internal return from their assets, lead them, in
equilibrium, to postpone consumption and save all of their available income. Successful, exiting
entrepreneurs, on the other hand, do not wish to save any capital but simply to consume all
proceeds from their activities before exiting. This optimizing behaviour is summarized by the




















Like entrepreneurs, bankers are risk-neutral agents who face a constant probability of exit from
the economy (their exit rate is denoted by 1−b).19 Exiting bankers are replaced by new agents
18Because we assume that all entrepreneurs receive a very small wage, entering entrepreneurs have a non-zero
stock of net worth.
19As with the entrepreneur's problem, bankers' nite-horizon assumption ensures that they do not become too
wealthy and nancially unconstrained. A small 
b will guarantee that, in the aggregate, bank net worth (bank
16who enter the economy with no assets. The entering rate of new bankers is such that their








t denotes bank consumption. The bankers' specicity arises from the technology that
allows them to monitor entrepreneurs, a function that is delegated to them by the households
(the ultimate lenders).
Bank capital, similarly to entrepreneurial net worth, is the sum of rental income and the




t + qt(1 − )kb
t: (36)
In the second part of the period, a banker who has succeeded in attracting deposits dt and
pledging at of their own capital can nance a project of size it. The banker's share of the return
from a successful project consists of Rb
tit units of the capital good, which can be used to buy
consumption or be saved:
cb
t + qtkb
t+1  st qtRb
tit(nt;a t;Gt); (37)
where st indicates whether the projects funded by the banker were all successful (st =1 )o ra l l
failed (st = 0); recall our assumption of perfect correlation across the outcomes of all projects
funded by a given banker. The incentives bankers have to save and consume are very similar to




















The linear nature of the production function for capital goods, the private benets, and the
monitoring technology permits us to construct aggregate investment by simply adding up the
capital) remains scarce.
17individual projects undertaken by each entrepreneur (the same aggregation procedure applies
to all the other variables except prices). We denote all aggregate variables by uppercase let-
ters, as opposed to the individual variables that are represented by lowercase variables. The
linearity features of the model also imply that only the rst moments of the distributions of en-
trepreneurial net worth, nt, and bank capital, at, matter for the economy; keeping track of the
distribution of net worth and capital across entrepreneurs and bankers is therefore not required.





where Nt and At denote aggregate entrepreneurial net worth and aggregate bank capital, re-
spectively, and Gt was dened in equation (27). Notice that a fall in either At or Nt leads to a
decrease in current investment, for given values of Gt. Further, the bank capital-asset ratio as
dened in (29) can be aggregated to yield the following economy-wide measure:
CAt =
At




(1 + ) It
Nt − 1
: (41)
The aggregation of (31) and (32), as well as of (34) and (39), yields the following expressions
























The law of motion for aggregate entrepreneurial net worth, Nt+1, and aggregate bank capital,

























Equations (46) and (47) show that banking capital and entrepreneurial net worth are in-
terrelated. Notably, equation (47) shows that aggregate bank capital at time t + 1 depends on
18the current values of both entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital. Therefore, a shock that
aects either of Nt or At will have consequences for the future values of bank capital.
The aggregation of (33) and (38) across all entrepreneurs and bankers yields the following
expressions for aggregate consumption by these agents:
Ce
t =( 1− e)qtgRe
tIt(Nt;A t); (48)
Cb
t =( 1− b)qtgRb
tIt(Nt;A t): (49)
2.9 Monetary policy
We denote the supply of money in the economy at the beginning of period t as Mt,a n dt h e
injection of new money during period t as Xt, giving Mt+1 = Mt + Xt.
As in Christiano and Gust (1999), monetary policy is interpreted as targeting a given value
for the nominal deposit rate, rd
t, and adjusting money supply in a manner that is consistent







t  (0;mp); (50)
where rd, y,a n d are the steady-state values of rd
t, yt,a n dt, respectively, and 
mp
t is an i.i.d.
monetary policy shock; that is, instances where monetary authorities depart from the systematic
portion of their rule (50).20
When y > 0, and  > 0, monetary policy follows a Taylor (1993) rule in which the central
bank increases the nominal interest rate in response to deviations of output and inﬂation from
their steady-state values.
2.10 The competitive equilibrium
The recursive, competitive equilibrium for the economy consists of (i) decision rules for ch
t , Mt+1,
Mc
t , ht,a n dkh
t+1 that solve the maximization problem of the household as expressed in (1) to
(3), (ii) decision rules for Ht and Kt that are consistent with the rst-order conditions in (11)







19and (12), (iii) decision rules for it, Re
t, Rb
t, Rh
t , at,a n ddt that solve the maximization problem
associated with the nancial contract in (14) to (20), (iv) the saving and consumption decision
rules of entrepreneurs in (33) and (34) and of bankers in (38) and (39), and (v) the following
market-clearing conditions:
(a) In the labour market, aggregate demand by nal-good producers equals the sum of the
individual supply decisions of households:
Ht = hht: (51)






(c) In the market for nal goods, aggregate production equals aggregate consumption and




t +( 1+)It; (53)
where Ch denotes aggregate households' consumption.
(d) In the market for capital goods, aggregate net demand equals the production from suc-
cessful investment projects:
Kt+1 =( 1− )Kt + gRIt: (54)
(e) Total demand for funds from bankers equals the sum of households' deposits and monetary
injections from the central bank:















The model's parameters are calibrated in a manner that ensures certain features of the non-
stochastic steady state approximately match their empirical counterparts. Further, whenever
possible, we follow the calibration procedures of recent contributions to the literature on agency
costs (Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Cooley and Quadrini
1999), to facilitate the comparison of our results with the results of those models.
The discount factor, ,i ss e ta t0 :99, so that the average real rate of return on deposits is
around 4 per cent.21 We set γ, the curvature parameter on labour eort in the utility function,
to a value of 2:0; this implies that the steady-state wage elasticity of labour supply is 1. The
scaling parameter, , is determined by the requirement that steady-state labour eort be 0:3.






where the technology shock, zt, follows an AR(1) process:
zt = z zt−1 + z
t; z
t  (0;z): (58)
We set k to 0:36 and h to 0:64. The autocorrelation parameter, z,i s0 :95; z, the standard
deviation of the innovations to zt,i s x e da t0 :01.
Monetary policy is assumed to take the form of the original Taylor (1993) rule, so that
 =1 :5a n dy =0 :5. The average rate of money growth (and thus the steady-state inﬂation
rate) is set at 5 per cent on an annualized basis, a value close to post-war averages in many
industrialized countries. The standard deviation of the innovations to the rule mp is also set
to 0:01.
The parameters that remain to be calibrated (g, b, b, R, , e, b) are linked more
specically to the capital-good production and the nancial relationship that links entrepreneurs
to banks and households. We set g to 0:9903, so that the (quarterly) failure rate is 0:97 per
cent, as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). We set the remaining parameters so that the steady-
state properties of the model display the following characteristics: (i) a capital-asset ratio (CA)
21Recall our interpretation of deposits not as literal bank deposits but rather as relatively illiquid assets that
provide a higher return than the most liquid assets, like cash.
21of around 15 per cent (close to the average ratio for U.S. banks in 2002, according to BIS
data); (ii) a leverage ratio (the size of entrepreneurial projects relative to their accumulated net
worth, I=N)o f2 :0; (iii) a 5 per cent ratio of bank operating costs to bank assets (BOC), which
matches the developed economies' estimate in Erosa (2001); (iv) a net return on bank capital
(bank equity, ROE) equal to 15 per cent on an annualized basis, a gure close to those reported
in Berger (2003) for the late 1990s; and (v) ratios of aggregate investment to output and capital
to output of 0:2 and 4, respectively. Table 2 shows the numerical values of the parameter that
emerge from the calibration. In particular, the parameter that governs the importance of banks'
monitoring costs, , is equal to 0:025.
We conduct some experiments where  is either increased (to  =0 :010) or decreased
( =0 :001). Where it is increased, the information friction between banks and depositors is
more severe; where it is decreased, the information friction is less severe. Note that, as a result,
depositors require that banks engage more of their own net wealth in nancing a project of a
given size, so that the steady-state value of the capital-asset ratio is rst increased (to just over
30 per cent) and then decreased (to 6 per cent). Section 6.1 examines the implications of these
changes in parameter values for the eects of monetary policy tightening.
Once all parameter values are chosen, an approximate solution to the model's dynamics
is found by linearizing all relevant equations around the steady state, using the methodology
described by King and Watson (1998).
4 Quantitative Findings
4.1 Wealth shock
The rst experiment consists of a one-time wealth transfer from bankers to households, the
results of which are illustrated in Figure 2. This experiment might be useful to consider the
eects of shocks that redistribute wealth between the agents in an economy (such as those
featured in the \debt-deﬂation" stories). Alternatively, the experiment can be thought of as
approximating exogenous decreases in bank capital, such as those suered by the branches of
Japanese banks that operate in the United States, examined by Peek and Rosengren (1997,
2000).
22Table 2: Parameter Calibration
Household preferences
γ
2.75 1.5 5.0 0.99
Final-good production
 k h e b z
0.02 0.36 0.6399 5  10−5 5  10−5 0.95
Capital-good production
 g b Rb
Baseline 0.025 0.97 0.67 0.5 0.09
More severe friction 0.05 0.97 0.67 0.5 0.06
Less severe friction 0.001 0.97 0.67 0.5 0.06
Resulting steady-state characteristics
CA I=N BOC ROE
Baseline 15% 2.0 5% 15%
More severe friction 31% 1.91 11% 15%
Less severe friction 6% 2.06 2% 15%
The shock examined is a one-time decrease of 10 per cent in bank asset holdings (KB
t )t h a t
is redistributed to households.22 As a result of this redistribution, bank capital declines imme-
diately (recall equation (44), which links the capital position of banks to their asset holdings);
see Figure 2. Bank capital is thus scarcer economy-wide and the required return on bank capital
rises accordingly. This leads the nancial contract to rely relatively less on bank capital to
nance projects (leading to a decline in the capital-asset ratio of banks) and relatively more
on entrepreneurial net worth (entrepreneurial leverage therefore falls). Since entrepreneurial
net worth is, to a large extent, predetermined, the fall in leverage must occur through sizable
declines in bank lending and aggregate investment. The decline in aggregate investment leads
to subsequent prolonged periods of depressed levels of bank capital and entrepreneurial net
worth, since bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth depend on lagged aggregate investment
through retained earnings. These low levels of capital and net worth themselves lead to further
periods of low bank lending and investment, in the interrelated manner described by equations
22Since bank asset holdings represent a very small portion of households' asset holdings in our model, the
positive wealth shock for households is negligible.
23(40) to (45). Note that these negative eects of shocks to the capital position of banks on bank
lending and investment accord well with the evidence presented in Peek and Rosengren (1995)
for American banks, and in Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000) for branches of Japanese banks
operating in the United States.
4.2 Monetary policy tightening
Figure 3 shows the basic model's response to a one percentage point contractionary monetary
policy shock (
mp
t = −0:01; recall equation (50)). This shock increases the opportunity cost of
the deposits that form part of the external nancing that banks arrange for entrepreneurs. This
increase in the cost of deposits leads banks to tighten lending, which in turn causes a fall in the
scale of the investment projects entrepreneurs are able to undertake. This reduction in project
scales means that both entrepreneurs and banks cannot leverage their net worth as much as
they could before. This is reﬂected in the fall of the leverage ratio, It=Nt, and in the increase
in the capital-asset ratio of banks. This countercyclical movement in the capital-asset ratio is
market-determined.






















This equation states that the per-unit share of a project's return that can be credibly promised to
households for deposit repayments (the right-hand side of the equation) is limited by the double
moral hazard problem. This limitation on payments to households means that the increase in rd
t
must be met with a reduced reliance on deposits (a decrease in dt) to nance a project of a given
size. In turn, this means that banks and entrepreneurs are required to invest more of their own
net worth in nancing that project: the ratios at=it and nt=it must increase, which means that
the bank capital-asset ratio increases while entrepreneurial leverage falls. Because the levels of
entrepreneurial net worth, nt, and bank capital, at, are for a large part predetermined (they
consist of accumulated, retained earnings from past periods: recall equations (42) and (44),
most of the adjustment is borne by a decrease in the size of investment projects that bankers
can nance; i.e., decreases in lending and in project scale, it.
Another way to interpret this result is to notice that the increase in the deposit rate, rd
t,
24worsens the moral hazard problem that aects the relationship between banks and households: as
depositors need to be better remunerated for their deposits, it becomes harder for the contract
to ensure that their participation constraint will keep the contract incentive-compatible. To
alleviate this worsening of moral hazard, banks pledge more of their own capital in the nancial
contract.
Aggregate investment thus falls on impact, while the price of new capital increases slightly,
as it would following a standard adverse supply shock. Earnings of banks and entrepreneurs
also fall, following the reduced scale of investment projects. Because entrepreneurial net worth
and bank capital consist of past retained earnings, which in turn depend directly on the scale
of past investment projects, the initial fall in investment leads to extended declines in the stock
of entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital. These declines help propagate the shock over
time, as the interest rate returns to its steady-state level immediately after the impact period.
Low net worth and bank capital continue to restrict the scale of investment projects for several
periods, which leads to persistent declines in total physical capital and thus output.
4.3 Adverse technology shock
Figure 4 illustrates the eect of a negative technology shock (z
t = −0:01; recall equation (10))
on the economy. The reduced productive capacities of the nal-good producers imply that
the rental rate on physical capital will be low for several periods in the future (recall that the
technology shocks are persistent). This lowers the demand for physical capital and, were the
supply curve of investment goods not to shift, would result in sharp drops in qt, the price of
newly created capital goods, and in investment.
The adverse technology shock also produces signicant upward pressures on inﬂation; con-
sidering the rule followed by monetary authorities (50), this implies that nominal interest rates
must rise. The rise in interest rates acts as a negative shift in the supply of investment goods,
following the intuition sketched out in the preceding section. In the experiment illustrated in
Figure 4, the inﬂationary pressures and the associated supply shift are signicant enough to
force an increase in the price of capital goods, qt,a sw e l la sa ne v e ns h a r p e rd r o pi ni n v e s t m e n t .
These reduced levels of investment lead to lower values for entrepreneurial net worth and
bank capital in the subsequent periods, which, through their negative impact on the supply of
25investment goods, continue to propagate the shock for several periods afterwards.
5 The Extended Model
The nancial contract that links banks, entrepreneurs, and households, which makes the produc-
tion of capital goods possible, is key to the role bank capital plays in the propagation mechanism
of monetary policy. To this point, however, the quantitative model in which we embed the nan-
cial contract has lacked the complexity to make our analysis comparable with those contained
in standard monetary versions of the real-business cycle model; e.g., Christiano and Gust (1999)
and Cooley and Quadrini (1999). We extend the model to make this comparison possible.
Specically, we assume that households are risk-averse, that the cash-in-advance constraint
faced by households is more involved than the one we have described so far, and that nancing
from banks is required not only for entrepreneurs but also for nal-good producers. These
extensions require modications to the model's equations.
First, the introduction of risk aversion in the utility of households implies that their in-













t ) − log(1 − ht − vt)
i
; (59)
where ht is hours worked and vt the time costs of adjusting nancial portfolios. The presence of
risk aversion means that households are seeking to smooth their consumption paths, an objective
that was absent from the basic model. Consumption smoothing implies that households are
less ready to experience big swings in consumption to take full advantage of the low price
of investment goods, for example, which will have an impact on the economy's response to
monetary shocks. Further, the smoothing motive has important implications for the behaviour
of the labour supply, and therefore for the determination of the economy's total output.
The assumption of risk aversion, however, does not lend itself well to the denition of the
nancial contract in equations (14) to (20), which depends on the risk-neutrality of all three
parties to the contract. To resolve this diculty, we introduce an insurance scheme that allows
households to insure themselves perfectly against all idiosyncratic risk related to the nancial
contract (this follows Andolfatto 1996 and Cooley and Quadrini 1999). The return on their
deposits is supplemented by the (net) receipts from this insurance, so that the (risk-free) rate
26of return on nancial assets is rd
t. This eectively renders the households risk-neutral with
respect to the nancial contract, because idiosyncratic risk has been diversied away and the
production of capital goods does not feature any aggregate risk.23 For the other household
decisions (regarding labour supply, physical capital holdings, etc.), the insurance scheme allows
us to treat the model as a representative agent model. Appendix A provides further details.
The second added feature to the optimization problem of households is that the cash-in-
advance constraint is comparable with those used in recent monetary models (as in Cooley
and Quadrini 1999). We assume that the current wage income of households is available for
purchasing consumption in the current period. This feature eliminates the distortion to house-
holds' labour-supply decision that expected inﬂation causes in the basic model. Further, we
assume that the (net) purchases of physical capital undertaken by households must be made
with cash. Inﬂation therefore distorts the investment demand of households, which in the basic
model introduced a distortion in their labour-supply decisions.
The combination of risk aversion (and perfect insurance) with wage income and physical
capital purchases in the cash-in-advance constraint leads us to rewrite equations (2) and (3) so







































The assumption that wage income is present in the cash-in-advance constraint begs the ques-
tion of how nal-good producers can pay the households' wage income in cash. This issue gives
rise to the third extension of the basic structure. We postulate that nal-good producers also
borrow funds from banking institutions, to pay for their wage bill. No information asymmetry
problem is involved in these types of loans. As a result, bank capital is not necessary to con-
duct this type of lending, because moral hazard and monitoring are not an issue.24 Although
23See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998, 587) for further discussion on the requirement that all participants in
contracts similar to those in our model be risk-neutral. We could have, alternatively, followed Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) and assumed the existence of a mutual fund that pools all savings from households and invests
those funds in banks, thus diversifying away idiosyncratic risk.
24As dened, these loans to nal-good producers are similar to those that are featured in standard models from
the limited-participation literature; see Christiano and Gust (1999) and Cooley and Quadrini (1999). Such loans
are often considered to correspond to the \working capital" or \lines of credit" of big rms.
27we could envision banks in our basic model engaging in the two types of lending, we instead
assume, without loss of generality, that there are two types of nancial intermediaries. First,
banks, as described to this point, lend to entrepreneurs and use their monitoring technology
to resolve the moral hazard that aects production in that sector. The private nature of this
monitoring gives rise to the need for bank capital. Second, banking agents (brokers) transfer
funds from households to nal-good producers, without encountering any information problems
and thus without holding any capital. Dening these two types of lending and nancial inter-
mediaries is reminiscent of the modelling framework of Bernanke and Gertler (1985). Note that
each nancial intermediary must oer households the same rate of return on deposits for the
two types of lending to coexist in equilibrium. Further, because the second type of lending is
costless, brokers make zero prots.
Consequently, the market-clearing condition for deposits reﬂects the fact that total sup-
ply, which arises from households' savings decisions and monetary injections (represented by
Mt−Mc
t +Xt
Pt ), must be divided by the two dierent classes of lending. Equation (55) thus be-
comes:









where the added demand for deposits is associated with the wage bill of nal-good producers
(wh
t Ht).
The market-clearing wage rate for households must reﬂect the fact that wage costs are bor-
rowed, making the nominal interest rate a distortion that aects labour demand. Consequently,
the complete model adds another dimension along which monetary policy contractions aect
the economy, by reducing the demand for labour that stems from the activities of nal-good
producers. Equation (12) is replaced by the following:
wh
t = ztF2(Kt;H t)=rl
t; (63)
where rl
t is the rate at which nal-good producers are able to get funding from the nancial




The calibration of the complete model follows the steps detailed in section 3. Because the
consumption-smoothing motive aects only the dynamic responses of the economy and not the
28features of the non-stochastic steady state, it does not impinge on the calibration.
A natural question is whether the eects of monetary policy tightenings that were identied
and discussed in section 4.2 remain a feature of the extended model. To this end, Figure 5 reports
the result of a contractionary shock that is similar to the one examined previously. First, the
responses of the economy in the extended model, while qualitatively similar to those in the basic
model (Figure 3), exhibit smoother paths. The limited intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(compared with the risk-neutral case of the basic model) leads the economy to converge back
to initial steady-state values much faster following the shock. Second, even though the size
of the monetary policy shock is the same in the two experiments, in the extended model the
actual increase in the nominal interest rate is modest relative to that in the basic model (Figure
3). This reduces the size of the leftward shift of the investment supply curve, thus limiting
the downward pressures on aggregate investment and the upward pressures on qt, the price of
the capital good. Third, compared with Figure 3, the responses of investment in the extended
model are characterized by a hump-shaped appearance.25 The responses of the extended-model
economy to a technology shock (not reported) exhibit the same qualitative features as those in
Figure 4 for the basic model. As is the case for the monetary policy shocks, the interest rate
response is much smaller than it is in Figure 4, which reduces the extent to which the investment
supply shifts and alleviates (at least initially) the upward pressure on qt.26
6 Bank Capital, Capital-Asset Ratios, and Monetary Policy
6.1 The importance of bank capital
To better assess the inﬂuence that bank capital has on the transmission of monetary policy
shocks, Figure 6 compares the responses of two economies following the same contractionary
monetary policy shock. First, the responses displayed in Figure 5 for the baseline economy are
repeated (they are the full lines in Figure 6). The second set of responses (the dashed lines)
reﬂect those of an economy where the nancial friction between banks and their depositors is
25Our model is thus able to replicate the hump shape in the response of investment that Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001) report. We, however, are able to generate this hump shape in an environment with nite-lived
agents, whereas Carlstrom and Fuerst nd that only their framework with innitely lived, impatient entrepreneurs
generates a hump shape in investment.
26The responses of the extended-model economy to a technology shock are available from the authors on request.
29eliminated: in such a case, the actions of banks are perfectly observable, so depositors know for
sure whether banks monitor. As a result, banks are not required to engage their own new worth
(their capital) in nancing projects; bank capital becomes unnecessary and is therefore not held
in equilibrium.
The alternative economy features higher entrepreneurial leverage than the baseline economy;
i.e., G takes on a value of 0:51 in the baseline but only 0:48 in the alternative economy (G is
approximately the inverse of entrepreneurial leverage). This implies that, for a given level of
entrepreneurial net worth, the investment project size that an entrepreneur can undertake is
signicantly lower in the baseline economy; see equation (40).
Figure 6 shows that the eects of a given monetary policy shock are dampened in the
case where bank capital is present, relative to the case where the absence of nancial frictions
renders bank capital unnecessary. Both the impact eect on aggregate investment (−0:39 per
cent) and the maximal impact (−0:58 per cent) are reduced, from their levels of −0:58 per
cent and −0:70 per cent, respectively. The responses of output are also reduced, but to a lesser
extent. Thus, a given increase in the cost of deposits, rd
t, because of the lower leverage of the
baseline economy, leads to less signicant tightening in bank lending, and less decreases in the
scale of projects and aggregate investment. This is consistent with the discussion in Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1998, 2001), in which the authors show that the introduction of a single source
of agency cost in an otherwise-standard business cycle model dampens the eect of economic
shocks relative to an environment where there are no agency costs. Moreover, the half-life of the
shock on investment is increased (from 9 to 10 periods) when the nancial friction on banks is
operative and bank capital is present: there is therefore evidence that the persistence of shocks
has increased.27
Figure 7 illustrates the same mechanism, but from a dierent angle: the severity of the
nancial friction is rst increased (the dashed lines) and then decreased (the pointed lines).
The gure shows that the response of investment and output to monetary policy shocks is
signicantly aected by the severity of the friction: the more severe the friction, the lower the
amplitude of the responses, and, to some extent, the more persistent the response.28
27Again, this is consistent with the discussion and the experiments presented in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998,
2001).
28Similar eects are present when the economy is subjected to technology shocks.
30To build intuition for these dierences in the amplitude and the persistence of the responses,
consider again equation (25). When the information friction is eliminated,  does not appear on
the right-hand side of the equation and thus the value of this term is higher. This means that
the per-unit share of an investment project that can be allocated to households is higher. For
a given (steady-state) value of the nominal deposit rate, the nancing of projects is now easier
and relies relatively more on household deposits; the steady-state value of dt=it is higher. This
relatively big contribution of household deposits in the nancing of projects makes it dicult
to replace such deposits when their opportunity cost increases following monetary tightening.
Another way to interpret this result is that an increase in deposit rates worsens the moral hazard
problem between households and banks less in an environment where the agency problem is
already severe; in such an environment, banks already hold relatively high stocks of capital, and
pledging more of it per unit of investment project (to replace household deposits) is less dicult.
A given increase in rd
t thus leads to more substantial decreases in aggregate investment in
the economy, where banks face no nancial frictions. In turn, this deeper decline in investment
leads to similar, deeper declines in future entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital (through
the retained-earnings eect), which continue to propagate the shock in subsequent periods, after
the initial eects of the rate increase have dissipated.
6.2 Cyclical properties of the bank capital-asset ratio
Although there are no regulatory capital requirements in our model, we have shown that the
market-generated bank capital-asset ratios will vary with the business cycle, reacting counter-
cyclically to monetary and technology shocks. Since one objective of the 1988 Basle Accord
on capital adequacy requirements was to facilitate, through harmonized measurement of capital
adequacy and increased disclosure, the exercise of market discipline over banks, it is natural to
ask whether our model, in which all movements in the capital-asset ratio are market-generated,
can replicate some of the cyclical properties of bank capital-asset ratios.
Table 3 compares the available data for the United States with our model implications. First,
we document the facts. Bank capital-asset ratios are measured as the sum of tier1 and tier2
capital over risk-weighted assets.29 Panel A of Table 3 shows that measured bank capital-asset
29According to the Basle regulations, tier1 capital consists of equity capital and published reserves from post-
31ratios in the United States are roughly half as volatile as output, whereas investment and bank
lending are approximately four times as volatile. The table also shows that capital-asset ratios
are countercyclical, particularly with respect to investment and bank lending. Since bank capital
moves fairly smoothly in the data, this countercyclical behaviour is intimately related to many
discussions about the procyclical nature of bank lending. The key message from these data is
that capital-asset ratios, although not very volatile, are signicantly and negatively related to
measures of bank lending and general economic activity.30
Turning to Panel B of the table, we nd that our model, when subjected to monetary policy
and technology shocks, replicates fairly well the countercyclical movements of the capital-asset
ratio relative to investment, bank lending, and GDP. These similarities between the dynamic
features implied by the model and those observed in the data indicate that market discipline
may have played an important role in shaping the evolution of bank capital and the capital-asset
ratio of banks over recent monetary history. This suggests that markets do have the ability to
discipline banks and that this discipline should be promoted by increasing the importance of
\Pillar 3" in the new Basle Accord.31 Further, warnings about the proposals to make the new
regulatory capital requirements themselves countercyclical should appeal to well-dened reasons
for overcoming what may be optimal responses to economic shocks.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a monetary, quantitative, dynamic model of the interrelations between
bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth on the one hand, and monetary policy and economic
activity on the other. The model features two distinct sources of moral hazard. The rst,
which arises because entrepreneurs can privately inﬂuence the probability of success of the
tax retained earnings, whereas tier2 capital consists of undisclosed reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general
provisions, hybrid debt/equity capital instruments, and subordinated debt. The weights on dierent classes of
assets range from zero on cash and other liquid instruments, to 50 per cent for loans fully secured by mortgage on
residential properties, to 100 per cent on claims to the private sector. These data are averages for all U.S. banks
and are from the BIS.
30An alternative measure of capital-asset ratios, which might match better with the corresponding measure in
the model, is the ratio of capital over loans. The countercyclicality identied in Table 3 is also present when this
alternative measure is used.
31The proposed new Basle Accords on capital requirements contain three \pillars": minimum regulatory re-
quirements, supervision, and market discipline. See Rochet (2003) for a review of the debate over the three pillars
of the new Basle Accord and a model in which the rst and third of these pillars can interact.
32Table 3: Cyclical Properties of the Capital-Asset Ratio: Model and Data
Cross-correlation of the capital-asset ratio with:
Variable
(X)
(GDP) Xt−4 Xt−2 Xt−1 Xt Xt+1 Xt+2 Xt+4
Panel A: U.S. economy
Capital-asset ratio 0:38 0:47 0:79 0:91 1 0:91 0:79 0:47
Fixed non-res. investment 4:41 −0:44 −0:48 −0:44 −0:38 −0:28 −0:20 −0:02
GDP 1 −0:47 −0:40 −0:27 −0:16 −0:00 0:08 0:12
Bank lending (C & I) 4:67 −0:42 −0:67 −0:75 −0:80 −0:76 −0:69 −0:40
Panel B: Model economy
Capital-asset ratio 0:53 0:85 0:94 0:98 1 0:98 0:94 0:85
Fixed non-res. investment 2:60 −0:07 −0:21 −0:32 −0:44 −0:52 −0:57 −0:60
GDP 1 −0:12 −0:25 −0:35 −0:45 −0:47 −0:48 −0:47
Bank lending 2:70 −0:10 −0:25 −0:37 −0:51 −0:56 −0:59 −0:59
Note: For the U.S. economy, 1990Q1-2003Q1. Capital-asset ratio: tier1 + tier2 capital over risk-weighted
assets (source: BIS); Fixed non-res. investment: xed investment, non-residential, in billions of chained
1996 dollars (source: BEA); GDP: gross domestic product, in billions of chained 1996 dollars (source:
BEA); Bank lending: commercial and industrial loans excluding loans sold (source: BIS). Investment
and Bank lending are expressed as the log of real per-capita quantity. All series are detrended using the
HP lter.
projects they engage in even in the presence of bank monitoring, leads banks to require that
entrepreneurs invest their own net worth in the projects they undertake. The second, which is
based on the fact that the monitoring activities of banks are themselves not publicly observable,
induces households to require that banks invest their own capital in entrepreneurial projects
before households deposit funds at banks. Entrepreneurial net worth and bank capital are thus
key determinants of the propagation over time of shocks that aect the economy, even after the
initial, direct impact of the original disturbances have faded away.
Quantitative simulations conducted with the model show that the presence of bank capital
can have a signicant impact on the amplitude and, to a lesser extent, the persistence of the
eects of monetary policy shocks. Specically, monetary policy contractions have dampened
but more persistent eects in our model|where the nancial friction between banks and their
depositors constrains the leverage of entrepreneurs|than in an economy where the friction is
eliminated and bank capital is not necessary. Further, the market-determined capital-asset
ratio of banks reacts countercyclically to shocks, tightening credit when adverse shocks aect
the economy; this countercyclical behaviour is also present in aggregate U.S. data.
33In future work, we plan to experiment with a version of the model that would position
the double incidence of moral hazard in the sector that produces the nal good, rather than
the current situation where the creation of new capital goods is aected by agency problems.
Contrasting these two frameworks would allow us to better link our results to the comparisons
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998, 2001) make between their \output" and \investment" models.
Further, it would be useful to analyze environments where the distribution of entrepreneurial
net worth and bank capital matters for the aggregate implications of the model.
Second, a thorough examination of the role of bank capital in the transmission of economic
shocks should account for the sizable heterogeneity in terms of size, capital position, or balance-
sheet composition that is observed in the banking sector of most countries.32 An environment
where such heterogeneity can arise from the dynamic eects of idiosyncratic shocks could yield
further insights into the importance of bank capital for monetary policy.
Finally, the introduction of externalities, possibly because the liabilities of banks circulate
and are used as means of payments, holds much promise. Such a framework could lead to a
potential role for government intervention in the banking sector, perhaps as the result of large
bank failures that impact on the viability of the exchange mechanism.
32This heterogeneity is documented, for the United States, by Ennis (2001b).
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9Figure 2. Negative Wealth Shock on Bank Capital: Basic Model
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40Figure 3. Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock: Basic Model
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41Figure 4. Adverse Technology Shock: Basic Model
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42Figure 5. Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock: Extended Model
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43Figure 6. Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock: The Importance of Bank
Capital
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44Figure 7. Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock: Sensitivity Analysis
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45Appendix A: Insurance within Risk-Averse Households in the
Extended Model
Following Andolfatto (1996) and Cooley and Quadrini (1999), we assume the existence of
an (actuarially fair) insurance market that allows households to eliminate the idiosyncratic risk
inherent in nancial contracts. Specically, a household can purchase yt real units of insurance
at the price jt. These units are paid to the household in the event that it receives a zero return



























where st is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the bank deposits are repaid (and
insurance payments are not necessary) and a value of 0 if deposits have a zero return and
insurance payments are made. Note that we have written the constraint in a manner that
removes any dependence in the choices made by households over the value of st; we assume that
this is their optimal response.
The rst-order condition for the choice of yt is as follows:
jt = Et[1 − st]=1− g; (A.2)
which repeats the statement that the insurance market is actuarially fair. That feature, as well
as the strict concavity of the utility function in consumption, implies that households will seek to
remove any risk to their nancial income ﬂows. This would require nancial revenues (including
net insurance revenues) when deposits bring no returns to equal revenues when deposits pay
their promised returns (net of insurance premiums). We thus have:




















Inserting this result back into (A.1) makes clear that the budget constraint is similar to the
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